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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical, unlikely though it may seem.
Plaintiff manufacturer brings a comprehensive environmental insurance coverage action, i.e., a suit against one hundred or so in-
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surance companies, seeking a declaration of its contractual rights
under insurance policies issued to it by defendants with respect to
its environmental liabilities spread throughout the country. The court
in the chosen forum has the requisite subject matter and personal
jurisdiction. The parties do substantial business in the forum, where
about 10% of the underlying liabilities arise, All agree that a plaintiff's choice of forum is to be accorded substantial deference. Nevertheless, the court decides that the case as pled is simply too
burdensome. It needs to be restructured. Accordingly, the court dismisses the suit insofar as the manufacturer seeks insurance for liabilities located outside the forum state. For these environmental
losses, the court directs the parties to litigate their disputes (over
the same insurance contracts) in each of the twenty-three states where
the liabilities arose (the "Site-Specific Approach"). Instead of one
judge, one series of pleadings, and one set of counsel, the court
would require twenty-three judges, twenty-three series of pleadings
and discovery, and twenty-three sets of counsel. To support its novel
exercise of judicial power and approach to case management, the
trial court invokes forum non conveniens, a doctrine whose traditional purpose is to avoid vexatious and harassing litigation.
Notwithstanding its improbability, the scenario is not fictional;
it is drawn from the experience of Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse"), which on March 22, 1988 had its suit, the
first "mega" comprehensive environmental insurance coverage action, fragmented in the manner described above.' Armed with this
ruling, two of the largest casualty insurers in the country, the American International Group, Inc. ("AIG") and Kemper Group, 2 embarked on a national campaign to persuade courts from Rhode Island
to California to fracture comprehensive environmental insurance
1. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v, Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 227 N.J. Super. 504, 547 A,2d
1167 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut, Ins. Co., 233 N.J. Super.
463, 559 A.2d 435 (1989).
2. AIG is one of the world's largest insurance organizations. Its lead companies include National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, New Hampshire Insurance Company, and

American Home Assurance Company. The Kemper Group, which includes Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (hereinafter "Lumbermens") and American Motorists Insurance Company, also ranks
among the top twenty property casualty insurance groups in the United States. Best's Insurance Re.
ports: Property-Casualty, 176, 1366 (1988).
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coverage along the lines adopted by the Westinghouse trial court.
They have had few successes. Most courts, including the Circuit
Court for Mercer County, West Virginia,3 and indeed most insurance
companies, 4 have rejected the Site-Specific Approach. Within the last
year, New Jersey's Appellate Division dealt AIG and Kemper a severe setback by reversing the Westinghouse trial court decision and
by repudiating its reasoning. 5
The Site-Specific Approach may be down, but it is definitely not
out. Union Carbide Corporation, Avnet, Inc., and United Technologies Corporation can attest to the resilience of its reasoning,
which has prevailed-at least for the moment-in their comprehensive suits originally filed in Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts, respectively. 6 In view of the professed allegiance of the AIG
and Kemper Groups to the Site-Specific Approach, 7 it seems clear

3. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88-C-96 (W. Va. Cir. Mercer County
Aug. 29, 1988), reported in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 10 (Oct. 25, 1988).
4. See, eg., Consolidated Brief of Defendant-Appellants, Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 212 Conn. 311, 562 A.2d 15 (1989); Brief of Respondent-Cross-Appellant, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 N.J. Super.
463, 559 A.2d 435 (1989).
5. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 233 N.J. Super. 463, 559 A.2d 435
(1989) (hereinafter "Westinghouse").
6. Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 294989 (Conn. Super. Danbury
Dist. Feb. 6, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 1-1 (Feb. 14, 1989), aff'd, 212 Conn.
311, 562 A.2d 15 (1989); Avnet, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 11091/86 (N.Y. Sup. N.Y.
County Feb. 1, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) J-1 (Feb. 14, 1989); United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Suffolk County Feb. 16, 1989),
reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-1 (Feb. 28, 1989), rev. granted, No. SJC-5228 (Mass.
Super. Jud. Oct. 13, 1989) (hereinafter "United Technologies").
7. The commitment to the Site-Specific Approach has been less than unwavering. From time
to time, whether out of perceived self-interest or breakdowns in the coordination of their national
strategy, Kemper companies have taken positions of record before courts throughout the country
endorsing the comprehensive approach to environmental insurance coverage litigation. For example,
in October 1987, Lumbermens filed its own comprehensive thirty-site environmental insurance coverage
action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. In defending its choice of
forum, Lumbermens argued that "[t]o the extent the case requires access to proof with regard to the
waste disposal sites, the location of these sites cannot be determinative in the convenience question."
Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Stay or, in the Alternative, to Transfer at
20, Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. SCM Corp., No. 87-527-JJF (D. Del. filed Oct. 6, 1987);
Avco Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 87-3496 transcript of proceedings at 14 (R.I. Super.
Feb. 16, 1988) (Lumbermens' counsel offering to stipulate that client will not file a motion to dismiss
on the basis of forum non conveniens if entire action involving sites located in several different states
is brought in a state which "has a logical relationship to this suit in terms of the waste sites or the
shipping materials . .. ").
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that courts throughout the country will be presented over and again
with the opportunity to use forum non conveniens as a means of
dismantling a comprehensive suit in favor of piecemeal, site-specific
litigation.
For those with a bent toward irony, there may be a certain pleasure in observing this metamorphosis of forum non conveniens from
a rather crude and cumbersome shield forged to protect harassed
defendants into a modern offensive weapon programmed to search
and destroy "mega" cases through defendant-activated and judicially-imposed fission. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the authors,
and as we have argued in several of the leading cases on this subject,8
the Site-Specific Approach represents a dangerous manipulation of
the forum non conveniens doctrine. We contend below that it imposes unnecessary transaction costs on the already exorbitantly expensive environmental cleanup effort. It perverts, in the name of
case management, a legal principle, which may, under appropriate
circumstances, be used to dismiss, but not to redraft, a complaint.
It cannot be justified under the private and public interest factors
traditionally associated with forum non conveniens rulings. It threatens, indeed it is intended, to undermine the widely recognized goal
of comprehensive adjudication. It is rejected by the decisive majority
of cases on point. In our view, the challenges posed by comprehensive environmental insurance coverage litigation can, and should,
be met through innovative case management techniques, not through
forum non conveniens dismissals.
II.

Tim EMERGENCE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL

INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTION AND THE SITE-SPECIFIC RESPONSE

To assess properly the merits of the Site-Specific Approach, it
is useful to step back and consider why comprehensive environmental insurance coverage actions are brought in the first place.
Prior to the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery

8. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super, 463, 559 A.2d 435; United Technologies, 3 Mealey's Litig.
Rep. (Ins.) H-I (Feb. 28, 1989); Carrier Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. CV 88-0352383S (Conn.
Super. Hartford-New Britain Dist. Aug. 25, 1988).
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Act 9 in 1976, there was little regulation of the disposal of the wastes 10

that Maurice Greenberg, AIG's President and Chief Executive Officer, has aptly termed the "by-product" of our "industrial development" and the "residue of progress."'" This is not surprising.

Our knowledge today of the hazards of such materials is "worlds
apart" 12 from what was known in that less environmentally attuned
era. In Mr. Greenberg's own words, "[m]ost of today's ground and
water contamination did not result from deliberate, conscious acts
but is an unintended result of our economic history."' 3
Nevertheless, in the legal climate of the 1980s, embodied most
prominently in the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), 14 manufacturers have discovered that the generation of industrial wastesthose by-products of manufacturing processes used in the 1970s,
1960s, and earlier-that were disposed of in conformity with all
applicable laws and industrial standards at that time, subjects them
today to staggering environmental liabilities.' 5 As applied by governmental agencies and as interpreted by many courts, liability under
CERCLA and its state progeny 16 may be imposed retroactively, with-

9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6920 (1982).
10. See, e.g., D. STERVER, LAW OF CI-EMicAL REGULATION AND HAzARDous WAsTE § 5.1 (1988).
11. Greenberg, Needed: A Fee on Commercial and Industrial Insurance to Finance Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, 19 E'mTL. L. REP. 10,254, 10,254 (1989). For a view critical of Mr. Greenberg's
proposed fee, see Kalis, Environmental Trust Fund: A Bailout For Insurance Industry?, Legal Times,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 29, col. 1.
12. New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 85-436-JLL (D. Del. Oct. 23, 1989),
reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 9, 10 (Oct. 24, 1989).
13. Speech by Maurice R. Greenberg to the Press Club in Washington, D.C., entitled The
National Environmental Trust Fund: Dealing with the Residue of Progress (March 2, 1989).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9620 (as amended).
15. Even the most ardent opponents of policyholders' attempts to access coverage for these
claims have acknowledged the plight in which many manufacturers find themselves. See Greenberg,
supra note 11 at 10,254; Thomas, The Tort System's Ticking Time Bomb, reprinted in part in 2
Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 24, 26 (Mar. 9, 1988) (Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Hartford Insurance Group; noting that under Superfund, Congress "has chosen to finance this enormous societal cost through an arbitrary, and unfair, liability scheme that attempts to reach those
corporations with the deepest pockets, regardless of their responsibility.").
16. See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, MAss. ANN.
LA'Ws ch. 21E §§ 1-18 (Law. Co-op. 1988); New Jersey Spill, Compensation and Control Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11-35.4 (,Vest 1982); West Virginia Hazardous Waste Emergency Response
Fund, W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5G-1-6 (1989).
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out regard to fault, and on a joint and several basis. 7 The defenses
to such liability are quite limited. 8 When manufacturers ensnared
in the net of CERCLA liability turned to their insurers for coverage
under the terms of the comprehensive general liability insurance
("CGL") 19 policies purchased over the years, the insurance indus-

try's response was, as a federal judge observed in a related context,
typically to "run for cover rather than coverage.' '20

17. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Jones & McSlarrow,
... but Were Afraid To Ask: Superfund Case Law, 1981-1989, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,430, 10,447
(1989); Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and InsuranceCoverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117, 121-23 (1988);
Price, Dividing the Costs of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several
Liability Appropriate?, 52 UMKC L. Rv. 339 (1984).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (covered entity must prove by preponderance of evidence that
environmental damage caused solely by act of God, act of war, or act or omission of third-party).
19. Until about fifty years ago, policyholders typically purchased liability insurance whose coverage was limited to a specific type of hazard, e.g., products and "completed operations," In the
late 1930s or early 1940s, the insurance industry began to market what eventually became the dominant,
standardized form of liability insurance covering public and private sector policyholders, the CGL
policy. To induce the purchase of this extensive and more expensive coverage, the industry explained
to insureds:
The burden of determining what to insure and what not to insure is removed from the
shoulders of the insured and placed squarely on the producer and the carrier. How much
better it is to say-'We cover everything except this and this and this' instead of 'We cover
only this and this and this.'
Eglof, Comprehensive Liability Insurance: The Outside, BEsT's FIRE & CAsuALTY NEws May 1941,
at 19 (emphasis in original); see also Sawyer, Comprehensive Liability Insurance: The Inside, BEST'S
Fnta & CASuALTY NEws May 1941, at 60 (Instead of insuring against only the hazards specified in
the policy, comprehensive liability insurance embraces all hazards not excluded.).
Consistent with these and similar representations, the CGL policy has been interpreted In a
manner to provide the maximum coverage for policyholders. See, e.g., Chesler, Rodburg & Smith,
Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18
RUTGERs L.J. 9, 14-15 (1986) ("CGL insurance purchased by commercial enterprises provides Indemnity for, and defense against, the broadest spectrum of property damage and personal injury
claims brought by third parties arising out of day to day business operations .. ."); Note, The
Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L, REv. 745,
757 (1984) ("The very title 'Comprehensive General Liability Insurance' suggests the expectation of
maximum coverage."); Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases No. 1072 (Cal, Super, San Francisco County
May 29, 1987), reprinted in 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 4440, 4466-68 (June 9, 1987) (hereinafter
"Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases") (refusing to adopt restrictive interpretation of COL policy in context
of asbestos claims and relying, in part, on policy's broad and flexible language).
20. Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 258 (DN.J. 1983);
see Kalis, Insurers Run for Cover, Not Coverage, 12 Legal Times 14, July 3, 1989, col. 1 (detailing
insurance industry's defensive strategy).
Occasionally, insurance companies, after covering environmental claims, have filed subrogation
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That left many manufacturers with two options: fund the liabilities out of operating revenues or sue in the hope that a court
would force the insurance companies to cover the losses. Some chose
litigation; others had the choice made for them by their insurers,
often in jurisdictions thought to be hospitable to the interests of
insurance companies. 2 ' Thus, in courthouses from West Virginia to
Washington, manufacturers and insurance companies are locked in
combat. The stakes are enormous-only the most intrepid even venture an estimate.2 2 The gladiators are well-equipped-virtually all

actions against other insurers on the risk, To the great embarrassment of their colleagues, some of
these subrogated insurers have contended quite forcefully in briefs that the standard insurer defenses
to environmental claims are legally unsound. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief on Appeal at 22,
Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 Mich. App. 706, 444 N.W.2d 813 (1989) (First State
Insurance Company; pollution exclusion "is aimed solely at deterring intentional and willful pollution
. ."); Allstate Insurance Company's Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
19, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., No. 85-2220-WD (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 1989) ("National
Union and INA should not be allowed to escape liability merely because Allstate is seeking reimbursement for cleanup costs rather than for some other type of damages"); see also, e.g., Plaintiff
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company's Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment
at 22-24, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich.
1988) (urging court to follow pro-policyholder ruling on "damages" in United States Aviex Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983)); Appellee's Brief at 14-15, Compass
Ins. Co, v. Cravens, Dargen & Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988):
Taken to its logical extension, [Compass'] argument would mean that if an insured cleans
up pollution for which it is responsible, thereby eliminating the injurious condition which
existed, then there is no coverage under its policy-But if the insured fails to clean-up the
pollution, leaving the water and land in a damaged condition, then there is coverage for
such damage. Surely such an illogical conclusion should not be allowed, particularly in light
of unambiguous policy language providing coverage for the effects of sudden and accidental
oil discharge.
See also Memorandum of Plaintiff Fireman's Fund Insurance Company in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Count 11 of Its Complaint at 10, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rogerson,
No. 85-0916-Y (D. Mass. July 15, 1985) (environmental insurance coverage dispute: "[w]ith this backdrop, Utica and CNA can hardly maintain that the allegations against [their policyholder] do not
raise a reasonable possibility that property damage occurred within their policy periods . ..").
21, See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Xerox Corp., No. B87-625D (D. Conn. filed Sept.
14, 1987); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Monsanto Co., No. H-88-34 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 19, 1988);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. JFM 88-99 (D. Md. filed Jan. 14, 1988), reported
in 2 Mealey's Litig, Rep. (Ins.) 18 (Feb. 9, 1988); General Reinsurance Co, v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp.,
No. 87-CV-8304 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 853 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988).
22, One of those braver souls is MrGreenberg, who cites estimates ranging between $150 and
$700 billion, Greenberg, supra note 11, at 10,254. Adding to this already enormous expense is the
"potentially staggering costs of [private party] property damage and bodily injury lawsuits" arising
out of alleged exposure to the hazardous wastes. See Thomas, supra note 15, at 27.
The EPA originally estimated that the average cleanup of a site appearing on the National Priority
List ("NPL") would cost about $8 million. Extent of the Hazardous Release Problem and Future
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casualty insurers and much of the country's manufacturing base are
in litigation.23 The blows are sometimes low-for example, one advisor to the insurance industry suggested, with apparent serious-

ness,24 that insurers forge an alliance in Congress against
policyholders, i.e., the paying clients to whom insurers owe a duty
of good faith and fair dealing. 25 The preferred mode of combat has
been the comprehensive environmental insurance coverage lawsuit. 6

FundingNeeds, CERCLA § 301(a)(1)(C) study, Final Report (Dec. 1984), cited in Chester, supra note
18, at 12 and n.18. In part because of the more rigorous cleanup standards under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, EPA's estimate, by 1986, had increased to between $30 million
and $50 million per site. Chesler, supra note 19, at 12 and n.23. As of November 1989, according
to the Superfund Hotline, 981 sites appear on the NPL, five of which are located in West Virginia.
Thomas cites a General Accounting Office Study that "there are at least 131,000 and possibly as
many as 425,000, hazardous waste sites that will have to be investigated, put on a priority list and
finally cleaned up." Thomas, supra note 15, at 24.
23. See, e.g., The Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-352D (W.D. Wash. July
24, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. E-1 (Sept. 12, 1989); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 231 N.J. Super. 1, 554 A.2d 1342 (1989); Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 3-87-140 (D. Minn.), reported in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 9
(Aug. 9, 1988); Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of America, No. C-3956-85 (N.J.
Super. Ch. Div. Bergen County), reprintedin 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-I (July 25, 1989); Polaroid
Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 88-5207 (Mass. Super. Middlesex County filed Aug. 3, 1988);
see also infra note 26.
24. Freed, The Politics of Pollution Liability, 89 BEsT's REv. 39 (March 1989).
25. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 485 (1973); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 917, 611 P.2d 149,
151-52 (1980); Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damage Litigation in the
U.S., 23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 812, 824-27 (1988). But see, e.g., Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 278
Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 965, 969 (1977).
As one commentator observed:
Allstate's slogan "You're in Good Hands," Travelers' motto of protection "Under the
Umbrella," and Fireman's Fund symbolic protection beneath the "Fireman's Hat," exemplify the industry's own efforts to portray itself as a repository of the public trust. But
with the public trust may be visited responsibility for a violation of such trust as evidenced
by recent recognition of extra-contractual "rights" of insureds or tortious responsibility of
insurers beyond the four comers of the insuring agreement-particularly in the first party
area.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 n.6 (Alaska 1988) (quoting
McMains, Bad Faith Claims-New Frontiers:A Multi-State Cause of Action in Search of a Home,
53 J. Am L. & Comm. 901, 904 (1988)).
26. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058 (Calif. Super. Santa Clara
County Jan. 3, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (Jan. 11, 1989); Purex Indus.,
Inc. v. Procter, No. C-446-935 (Calif. Super. Los Angeles County Nov. 7, 1988), reprinted in 3
Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (Nov. 22, 1988); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Xerox Corp., No. B87625D (D. Conn. filed Sept. 14, 1987); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JAl18-1-CV (Del. Super. New Castle County filed Jan. 20, 1988), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
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Grounded in state law and generally lacking complete diversity,
these contract-based actions typically may be brought only in state

court. 27 Since there is at least some likelihood that the forum will
elect to apply its own substantive law, 28 and further since there are
(Ins.) 21 (Feb. 9, 1988); North American Philips Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA155 (Del. Super. New Castle County Oct. 21, 1988); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., No. 89C-AU-99-I-CV (Del. Super. New Castle County filed Aug. 16, 1988); United Technologies, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-i (Feb. 28, 1989); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
No. 87-6624 (Mass. Super. Suffolk County Jan. 20, 1989); Whirlpool Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., No. 88-1062-CZ-Z (Mich. Cir. Berrian County filed Apr. 11, 1988), reported in 2 Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 19 (Apr. 27, 1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 720 F. Supp.
597 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. L-97515-87 (N.J. Super.
Union County Dec. 17, 1987); RCA Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. L87-4931 (N.J. Super. Law
Div. Mercer County filed Dec. 2, 1987); BOC Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 86840-88
(N.J. Super. Union County Jan. 10, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (Jan. 24,
1989); Peabody Int'l Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. C87-0242 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.
Mercer County filed Aug. 10, 1988); American Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No.
W-56581 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Essex County filed Nov. 9, 1988); Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super
463, 559 A.2d 435; Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio
1987); In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., No. 764 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1988), reprintedin 2 Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Ins.) C-1 (Sept. 28, 1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., No. CV-8901-0158 (Ohio Comm. Pl. Summit County filed Jan. 17, 1989); Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., No. 87-3497 (R.I. Super. filed Aug. 14, 1987); Avco Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
No. 87-3496 (R.I. Super. Feb. 24, 1988); Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88C-96 (W. Va. Cir. Mercer County Aug. 29, 1988), reported in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 10 (Oct.
25, 1988). But see Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 88-325 (July
18, 1988), reprinted in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-1 (July 27, 1988) (retaining jurisdiction at
request of policyholder, although more comprehensive environmental insurance coverage action was
pending in Minnesota).
This list is not, and does not purport to be, comprehensive.
27. The federal courts may be available where the policyholder was insured by the Insurance
Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. (hereinafter "ICI"), a relatively minor participant in certain Lloyd's
policies. The majority of the stock of ICI is apparently owned by the Republic of Ireland. According
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982), federal district courts have
original jurisdiction over "any non-jury civil action against a foreign state ....
9 On the strength
of this somewhat arcane provision, three courts have issued decisions retaining jurisdiction over environmental insurance coverage actions (involving ICI) that lacked complete diversity among the parties. See In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., No. MDL 764 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1988), reprinted in
2 Mealey's Lit. Rep. (Ins.) C-I (Sept. 28, 1988); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
693 F. Supp. 340 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see also National Sur. Corp. v. Sangamo Westin, Inc., Nos. 8:883437-17 and 6:89-642-17 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) G-I (Aug.
22, 1989) (retaining jurisdiction over environmental insurance coverage action, which lacked complete
diversity, even after ICI, whose presence apparently supplied federal jurisdiction, had been dismissed
as a defendant). But see Sequa Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 89-234-JRR (D. Del. Oct.
5, 1989), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 11 (Oct. 10, 1989) (remanding to state court in
apparently similar circumstances). To the extent that these cases rely on principles of pendent party
jurisdiction, they may no longer be good law. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989)
(rejecting pendent party jurisdiction in context of action under Federal Tort Claims Act).
28. See Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, I Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at 4,453 (June 9, 1987)
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sharp conflicts among the states as to coverage for environmental
liabilities under identical insurance contract language, 29 it is not surprising that defendant insurance companies named in such suits often react by erecting a host of procedural hurdles: the complaint
lacks the necessary specificity;30 the declaratory judgment action fails
to state a case or controversy against a particular defendant;3 the
plaintiff has failed to name certain necessary or indispensable parties;3 2 or the policyholder has failed to comply with certain pre-suit
conditions rendering the action premature. 3 Although it may come
as a surprise that large, sophisticated, national and international
insurance companies could credibly argue that they are inconvenienced, numerous insurers have invoked the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in support of their position that another court (typically
one whose insurance jurisprudence is deemed to favor the insurer)
34
should hear the case.
(quoting Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974)) (applying law of forum, California,
since insurance contract interpretative principles of possibly interested jurisdictions, where discernible,
do not conflict; "normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be expected,
as a matter of course, to apply the decision found in the law of the forum"); Crown Cork & Seal
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. L-007456-88 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Hudson County Aug.
8, 1989) (applying New Jersey law to environmental insurance coverage action although neither policyholder nor its insurers were incorporated or headquartered in that jurisdiction, and most of the
sites were located out-of-state); cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. JFM-88-99 (D.
Md. Aug. 4, 1989), reprintedin 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep, (Ins.) F-i (Aug. 22, 1989) (interpreting Westinghouse as suggesting that New Jersey law would apply to substantive coverage disputes).
29. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
30. E.g., Monsanto Co. v, Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-118, slip op. at 15 (Del.
Super. New Castle County May 22, 1989) (treating such a motion as moot in light of scheduling
order requiring policyholder to provide more specific information).
31. CompareNorth America Philips Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 886-JA-1 15 (Del,
Super. New Castle County Aug. 21, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) D-I (Sept, 12,
1989) (rejecting argument) with Borg-Warner Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88-539 (N.Y, S.
Tompkins County Sept. 15, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) B-I (Oct. 10, 1989)
(accepting argument).
32. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co,, No. 88C-JA-118, slip op. at 15
(Del. Super. New Castle County May 22, 1989) (rejecting argument that policyholder failed to join
underlying governmental claimants as necessary parties); cf. Reading Co. v. Travelers Indem, Co.,
No, 87-2021 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988), reprinted in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) B-I (Mar. 23, 1988)
(asbestos insurance coverage action; denying motion to dismiss for failure to join certain insurers
possibly on the risk).
33. See United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No, 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Suffolk
County Oct. 24, 1988), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) B-i (Nov. 8, 1988) (finding that
policyholder failed to comply with certain alleged pre-suit conditions in property insurance policies
and dismissing action without prejudice with respect to such policies).
34. See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 87-6624 (Mass. Super. Suffolk
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As set forth in the Introduction, this article concerns itself not

with these rather standard defenses, but rather with the position,
advanced in West Virginia and throughout the country, by a small

but powerful group of insurance companies, primarily the AIG and
Kemper Groups, that comprehensive adjudication of environmental

insurance coverage disputes. is inappropriate no matter where the
action is sited. Instead, these insurers advocate that a separate lawsuit be instituted in each state where an underlying waste site is
located. Their approach, the Site-Specific Approach, is designed to
destroy the ability of the policyholder and insurance companies to
resolve, on a comprehensive basis, a dispute that will have a profound impact upon this country's physical and economic landscape.
That dispute, engendered by CERCLA and its draconian regime, is

whether the insurance industry must participate alongside its public
and private sector policyholders in the nation-wide environmental
cleanup. In a system that is already widely criticized by the insurer
and policyholder communities alike for its arbitrariness and inefficiency,3 6 it is worth exploring carefully indeed whether this
County Jan. 20, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-i (Feb. 14, 1988) (rejecting
argument of Maryland Casualty Company and four other insurers that case should proceed in New
York); United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Suffolk County
Oct. 17, 1988), reprintedin 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) C-I (Oct. 24, 1988) (accepting argument of
Travelers Indemnity Company and two other insurers that case insofar as it involved claims of Carrier
Corporation, a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation, should proceed in New York or Connecticut); cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. L-069351-87 and L-06935287 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Union County Sept. 18, 1989) (declining to defer to action pending in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania as urged by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company).
35. A clear signal of the controversy's importance emanates from the number of federal and
state governmental entities, including the Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia, filing briefs amicus curiae (opposing insurers' efforts to avoid coverage). See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, Shapiro v. Public Service Mut. Ins.
Co., 19 Mass. App. 648, 477 N.E.2d 146 (1985); Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. Van De Kamp,
Attorney General of the State of California, in Support of Petitioners Aerojet-General and Cordova
Chemical Company, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, No. A042785 (Cal. App. San Mateo
County filed July 13, 1988); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department
of Environmental Resources, United States Fidelity & Guar. Ass'n v. Lower Paxton Township, No.
141 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 18, 1988); Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on
Rehearing En Banc, Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977 (8th Cir. 1988); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia, Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., No. CC999 (V. Va. filed Jan. 17, 1990).
36. See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 10,254 ("Studies show that, of the total funds spent since
1980 on environmental matters, something between 30 and 60 percent has gone for legal expenses");
Thomas, supra note 15, at 26; Kalis, supra note 20, at 14.
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wholesale attack on the comprehensive suit is legally supported.
III.

TiE DEVELOPMENT AND CONTENT OF THE FORUM NON
CoNVENIENs DOCTRINE

It is often assumed that forum non conveniens-with its Latin
name-has an ancient lineage.3 7 Eminent legal figures such as Justice
Robert Jackson and Paxton Blair have purported to trace the doctrine's

antecedents back to English and Scottish case law.38 As Professor Stein
convincingly demonstrates, however, forum non conveniens, at least
as currently understood, is of much more recent vintage. 39 In the
era of Pennoyer v. Neff,4° and the enforcement of rigid territorial
limits on the power of state courts, there was little need or opportunity

to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine. As courts began to
apply a more functional approach to personal jurisdiction, ultimately
culminating in the International Shoe Co. v.

Washington4t

37. The doctrine is often attributed to Paxton Blair's article published in 1929 in the COLUMBIA
LAW RavEaw. See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM.
L. R v. 1 (1929). Blair, who at the time was an associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, was
fortunate to have his article (in the words of one commentator) meet "with the kind of judicial
reception that law professors dream of." Stein, Forum Non Conveniens And The Redundancy of
Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rav. 781, 811 (1985); see Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co.
326 U.S. 549, 557 n.4 (1946) (citing Blair); Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S.
413, 423 n.13 (1932) (citing Blair).
Perhaps as a consequence of Blair's success, forum non conveniens has garnered its share of
print in the country's law reviews. Among the renowned scholars and jurists that have written on
the subject are Professors Bickel and Currie as well as Judge Friendly. See generally Bickel, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35
CORNELL L. Q. 12 (1949); Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv.
405, 416-38 (1955); Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). A selection
of other works follows. Braucher, The Inconvenient FederalForum, 60 HARv. L. Rv. 908 (1947);
McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J. 191 (1989); Morely,
Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 24 (1973); Stein,
supra; Note, Considerationsof Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CAIw.
L. REv. 565 (1986); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
47 U. Cm. L.REv. 373 (1980); Note, Forum Non Conveniens in the Absence of an Alternative Forum,
86 COLUM. L. Rav. 1000 (1986) (hereinafter "Alternative Forum"); Note, The Convenient Forum
Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1967). On the experience of forum non conveniens in environmental
insurance coverage litigation, see Kalis & Reiter, Examining Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum
Issues Before Litigating Environmental Insurance Coverage, 2 ENVTL CLAMs J. 165 (Winter 1989)
(offering a viewpoint similar to that presented in this Article).
38. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); Blair, supra note 37, at 20.
39. See Stein, supra note 37, at 796-802; Alternative Forum, supra note 37, at 1001-02.
40. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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minimum contacts test, plaintiffs could more often bring a lawsuit
in one of many different jurisdictions. It is hardly coincidental,
therefore, that the seminal, and still leading, case on forum non
conveniens was decided two years after InternationalShoe loosened

the reins on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The case is Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.42
The facts of Gulf Oil may be briefly summarized. Gilbert Storage
and Transfer Company ("Gilbert") brought a diversity action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against Gulf Oil Corporation ("Gulf Oil"), a Pennsylvania corporation at the time. Gilbert claimed that, in the course of making
a gasoline delivery, Gulf Oil negligently caused a fire, resulting in
substantial damage to Gilbert's warehouse in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Acknowledging that venue was proper and that Gulf Oil was subject
to the district court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court nonetheless
determined that the case was properly dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.
The Gulf Oil analysis, though familiar, is worthy of recitation.
Forum non conveniens presumes two forums in which a plaintiff
may bring its suit, and offers guidelines in making the choice between them with much discretion left to the trial court. 43 The relevant
considerations can be grouped into two categories: private interests
and public interests. 44 The private interest factors-those affecting
the litigants themselves-consist of (i) the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (ii) the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; (iii) the possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; (iv) and all other practical concerns

42. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
43. Rather presciently, the Court acknowledged the possibility that some courts might use this
discretion to avoid cases deemed to be unappealing. The Court pronounced itself satisfied that experience had disclosed few such abuses. Id. at 508; see also Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 587, 138
A.2d 44, 51 (1957) (declining to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and noting "the prospect
of a lengthy trial offers a strong temptation to decline to entertain the suit"); cf. Westinghouse, 233

N.J. Super. at 468, 559 A.2d at 437 ("We must, as a judicial system, devote our efforts to determining
how best to adjudicate controversies on their merits, not how to avoid adjudication.").
44. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
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that lead to an easy, expeditious, and inexpensive trial of the case. 45

The public interest factors are: (i) docket congestion; (ii) the burden
of jury dufty on a community that has no relation to the lawsuit;

(iii) the benefit of having cases affecting a particular forum adjudicated in that forum; (iv) the avoidance of choice-of-law issues;
and (v) the benefit of having a court familiar with the substantive
46
law adjudicate the suit.

Gulf Oil is not binding on a state court's determination of how,
or whether, to apply forum non conveniens principles.47 In fact, a

small number of states has declined to adopt the doctrine at all. As
of this writing, West Virginia remains among this dwindling minority, 48 although in Gardner v. Norfolk & W. Ry. ,49 Justices Neely
and Brotherton, in dissent, expressed their approval of the doctrine 0
While the contours of the forum non conveniens doctrine vary
from state to state, the Gulf Oil public and private interest factors
are almost universally adopted." In applying these factors, courts

45. Id. at 508.

46. Id. at 509. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S.
928 (1982), the Court returned to the doctrine, and found the Gulf Oil methodology still satisfactory.
Piper, 454 U.S. at 249-60. In Piper,the Court held that the court of appeals had erred in assuming
that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law bars dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.
The Court also concurred with the trial court's determination that the presumption favoring a plaintiff's choice of forum applied with less force when the plaintiff is a foreigner. Id. at 261.
47. See, e.g., Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 3 (1950) ("According to its own notions of
procedural policy, a State may reject, as it may accept, the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] for
all causes of action begun in its courts.").
48. See Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 Ohio St. 3d 123, 126 n.3, 519
N.E.2d 370, 372 n.3 (1988); see also Comment, Procedure-IntrastateApplication of Forum Non
Conveniens, 70 W. VA. L. REv. 249, 252-53 (1968).
49. 372 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1132 (1989).
50. Id. at 793-96 (Neely, J., dissenting). The majority refused to apply the doctrine to cases
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). Writing for the court,
Chief Justice McHugh did caution, however, that "[o]ur holding ... does not deny or recognize the
applicability of the common law principle of forum non conveniens to cases not brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act." Gardner, 372 S.E.2d at 793.
51. See Stein, supra note 37, at 831; REsTATEMENT (SEcoN) oF CONFLIcT OF LAWS, § 84 com-

ment c (1971). Its lure is such that to this day the Gulf Oil analysis is recited almost reverentially
by nearly every court considering a forum non conveniens motion. With perhaps only the slightest
exaggeration, Professor Stein describes the style of federal and state forum non conveniens decisions
as follows:
[Tihey are typically one or two pages in length and consist primarily of block quotations
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typically have been guided by several legal principles that for the

most part are drawn from Gulf Oil itself. A defendant moving to
dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens bears a heavy burden.

A plaintiff's choice of forum is presumptively valid.5 2 It is sometimes

stated that the doctrine is concerned primarily with preventing harassment and vexation to the defendant. 5 Dismissals are granted
rarely 5 4 especially, some courts have explained, when the cause of

action is based on a contract. 5 The defendant must establish that
plaintiff's choice of forum is inappropriate, even demonstrably inin whose
appropriate 5 6 and generally must offer an alternative forum
57
weighted.
strongly
is
favor the balance of conveniences
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE GULF OmL TEST

Prior to the judicial initiative of the Westinghouse trial court,
forum non conveniens had never been used by any court as a substitute for case management. Ultimately, this gap between the doctrine's traditional role-to dismiss suits under limited circumstancesand its function under the Site-Specific Approach-to restructure a
large case-was exposed by the Westinghouse appellate court, which

of the public and private factors listed in Gulf Oil. The 'analysis' frequently is limited to
a statement that in applying these factors the court found the balance of public and private
interests to weigh in favor of retention or dismissal.
Stein, supra note 37, at 831.
52. E.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508; Starr, 25 N.J. at 584, 138 A.2d at 50.
53. E.g., Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 286, 196 A.2d 513, 518 (1963); see generally Braucher,
supra note 37, at 910, 930.
54. E.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 (examining whether plaintiff's is "one of those rather rare
cases where the doctrine should be applied"); Carey-Canada, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., No.
83-1106, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (refusing to transfer
asbestos insurance coverage case; "[d]ismissal for reasons of forum non conveniens is rare"); Kearsarge
Metallurgical Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 162, 169, 418 N.E.2d 580, 584 (1981).
55. E.g., Amercoat Corp. v. Reagent Chem. & Research, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 331, 347, 261
A.2d 380, 388 (1978); Van Dam v. Smit, 101 N.H. 508, 509, 148 A.2d 289, 291 (1959).
56. E.g., Civic S. Factors Corp. v. Bonat, 65 N.J. 329, 333, 322 A.2d 436, 438 (1974); Kolber
v. Holyoke Shares, Inc., 59 Del. 66, 69, 213 A.2d 444, 447 (1965) ("The dismissal of an action on
the basis of the doctrine, and the ultimate defeat of plaintiff's choice of forum, may occur only in
the rare case in which the combination and weight of the factors to be considered balance overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant.").
57. E.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508 ("But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."); Kearsarge, 383 Mass. at 169,
418 N.E.2d at 584; Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 384
U.S. 861 (1954).
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rejected the position out of hand. Even if the Site-Specific Approach
is assumed to present an alternative forum requiring that the public
and private interest factors be applied, the analysis below establishes
that the approach fails.
A.

Private Interest Factors

The fundamental premise of the Site-Specific Approach is that
environmental insurance coverage litigation is inherently site-specific.
In briefs, AIG and Kemper have contended with great vigor that a
host of factual questions (e.g., whether the policyholder intended
to pollute, when the wastes were disposed of, how the damage process developed) are the crux of the dispute between policyholder and
insurer. So great and varied is this asserted array of factual issues
that each site purportedly requires independent and intensive sitespecific discovery and factfinding. Because this is so, AIG and Kemper conclude that a separate suit for each state where a site is located
will be far more convenient than a comprehensive action, since the
relevant witnesses and documents will be located nearer to the courthouse. While the argument has some surface appeal, it collapses on
meaningful review.
Contrary to the premise supporting the position of AIG and
Kemper, environmental insurance coverage litigation is preeminently
contractual, not site-specific. The focus is the policyholder's insurance program, not liability for the cleanup of the wastes. 8 Certainly,
58. Purex Indus. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, No. B030780, slip op. at 13 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
Mar. 21, 1989) (retaining jurisdiction over environmental insurance coverage action; "The primary
right of plaintiff alleged in both the California and New Jersey actions is the right to insurance
coverage in the form of reimbursement for the cost of environmental cleanup ....
The existence of
that right turns on interpretation of the insurance policies ... ."); Armotek Indus. v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, No. 88-3110, slip op. at 5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
(Ins.) E-I (Apr. 11, 1989) ("Regarding the convenience of the witnesses, it should be kept in mind
that this case is not about pollution in Connecticut [where the only site was located]; rather it is
about a contract .... ") (hereinafter "Armotek"); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No.
88C-JA-1 18 (Del. Super. New Castle County Oct. 21, 1988), reprintedin 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.)
F-I, F-8 (Oct. 25, 1988), rev. denied, (Del.), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 16 (Dec. 13,
1988) (hereinafter "Monsanto") ("The Court agrees with Monsanto that the issues involved may not
require factual discovery. The Court may use substantive law to construe the terms of the insurance
policies."); North American Philips Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-155 (Del. Super.
New Castle County Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 0-1 (Oct. 25, 1988),
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there have been a few well-publicized trials involving a detailed factual examination of the activities at a particular site. 9 Still, the crit-

ical issues separating policyholders from insurers are primarily legal,6
require little or no site-specific factual development and discovery,

and are capable of resolution by summary judgment or motion to
dismiss. These issues include: (i) whether groundwater contamination
61
is "property damage" within the meaning of the CGL policy; (ii)

whether governmental cleanup orders or actions for response costs
under CERCLA or similar statutes constitute "damages" within the

meaning of the CGL policy; 62 (iii) whether cleanup costs incurred
in anticipation of governmental orders are amounts the policyholder
is "legally obligated to pay as damages;"

63

(iv) whether adminis-

trative notices, such as the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") so-called potentially responsible party ("PRP") notice let-

ter constitutes a "suit" that merits a defense by the insurers pursuant
to their policies; 64 (v) whether an insurer whose policy has been determined to be on the risk ("triggered" in insurance argot) may

reduce its liability to the policyholder because property damage oc-

curred in other triggered policy periods; 65 and (vi) whether the so-

rev. denied (Del.), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 16 (Dec. 13, 1988) (hereinafter "North
American"); cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., No. 87-3050, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super.
Middlesex County May 27, 1988), reprintedin 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) G-1 (June 8, 1988) ("The
underlying asbestos-related cases are not the essence of the dispute between Grace and its excess
insurers. The action presently before this court concerns the existence of, and the interpretation of
excess liability insurance policies.").
59. E.g., Occidental Unit Liable for Cost of Site Cleanup: Judge in New Jersey Rules Dixon
is Responsibility of Diamond Shamrock, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1989, § A, at 9, col. 1; Shell Faces
Cost Up to $1 Billion For Toxic Waste, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1988, § A, at 3, col. 1.
60. E.g., Monsanto, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-8 (Oct. 25, 1988).
61. Compare Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 55700-4 (Wash. Jan. 4, 1990),
reprinted in 4 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) B-I (Jan. 16, 1990) with Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins.
Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
62. Compare Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989) with
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en

banc).
63. Compare United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d
838 (1983) with Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
64. Compare Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co., 180 Mich. App. 651, 447 N.W.2d 853 (1989) with
Dextrex Chem. Indus. v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
65. Compare New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 85-436-J1, slip op. at 38-
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called pollution exclusion bars coverage. 66
There are several environmental insurance coverage issues that
may involve some limited, site-specific factual disputes. Yet, even
these issues (e.g., trigger of coverage, 67 the polluting intent of the
insured,68 and the owned property exclusion 69) in the first instance
40 (D. Del. Oct. 23, 1989), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 9-10 (Oct. 24, 1989) with Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 657
F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
66. As the insurance companies themselves represented on record in securing the exclusion's
approval by the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner, the so-called pollution exclusion merely clarifies the policy's requirement that the policyholder neither expect or intend the pollutional damage.
See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (I1.
App. 1989); Broderick Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 86-2-1033 (D. Col. Oct.
4, 1989), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 3 (Oct. 10, 1989) (hereinafter "Broderick"). But
see, e.g., Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (1984) (applying exclusion
to deny coverage for bodily injury claims allegedly arising out of more than twenty years of discharges
in course of business).
West Virginia was hardly the only state in which such representations were made. For example,
in states such as Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio as well as West Virginia, the Mutual Insurance
Rating Bureau and the Insurance Rating Bureau filed a standard explanatory memorandum concerning
the so-called pollution exclusion, on behalf of their members, and stated: "This endorsement is actually
a classification of the original intent, in that the definition of occurence excludes damages that can
be said to be expected and intended." This evidence was not before the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Techalloy. See Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 5, 487 A.2d at 827 ("Techalloy offers no alternative
interpretation ... which would render [the provision] ambiguous and capable of our interpretation").
The lessons of Techalloy have not gone unnoticed by policyholders. See, e.g., Broderick, 3 Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at 3 (Oct. 10, 1989) (introducing key drafting history documents into evidence). It
will be a rare case, indeed, when substantial discovery or trial testimony does not concern these types
of insurer representations, which, of course, bear no relationship to the location of the waste sites.
67. The COL policy is triggered by the existence of, inter alia, "property damage" within the
policy period. Because the COL policies do not define what constitutes "property damage" in the
context of environmental contamination, the courts have adopted various approaches to the trigger
of coverage. Among the most prominent are the exposure theory-when the property is exposed to
the deleterious substance, see, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71
(E.D. Mich. 1987); the "manifestation" theory-when the damage is discovered, is contained or
becomes manifest, see, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986);
and the continuous injury theory. See, e.g., Solvents Resources Service of New England, Inc. v.
Midland Ins. Co., No. L-25610-83 (Nov. 17, 1986), reprinted in 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 3,609,
3,632 (Jan. 13, 1987). Under all three theories, but especially the exposure and continuous injury
triggers, historic CGL policies may be on the risk for today's environmental liabilities.
68. Compare United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139
(W.D. Mich. 1988) with New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., Nos. 87CA0082 & 87CA0092
(Colo. App. Oct. 19, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) D-1 (Oct. 24, 1989).
69. See, e.g., Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp.
1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371,
vacated due to settlement, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 830085 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1984), reprinted in 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1544, rev'd on other grounds,
772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985).
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raise pure questions of policy interpretation that may be decided as
a matter of law without site-specific discovery. 70 Moreover, much
information regarding any residual factual issues (e.g., dates of shipment and the nature and degree of contamination) is developed in
the underlying administrative proceeding and need not be repeated
in the coverage litigation.7 '
As environmental insurance coverage litigation continues to unfold, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, contrary to the premise of the Site-Specific Approach, key discovery battles concern the
drafting, marketing, and interpretation of the policy forms and policies at issue. Many courts have relied on the insurers' highly damaging statements in favor of coverage, 72 and it is not surprising that,
for the most part, courts have permitted discovery into the meaning
and interpretation of the key policy terms. 73 As policyholders pursue
this discovery, a factual record drawn from the insurers' own words
is being developed that undercuts their position on some of the most
hotly contested coverage issues. 74 While it is true that, through broad

70. Nothing precludes a court from making its legal ruling prior to a full development of the
factual record, an exercise that might prove unnecessary once the parties are enlightened as to the
applicable law. See Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 478-79, 559 A.2d at 443 (advocating such an
approach as a means for managing the case).
71. For example, the EPA's so-called § 104 CERCLA information request typically requires
that the addressee provide the following information regarding its generation of hazardous wastes:
(i) dates of transport; (ii) the identity of the transporter; (iii) the method of transport; (iv) the volume
of hazardous materials per transport; (v) a general description of the types of materials transported,
as well as (vi) documents evidencing the same. In North American, the court explained in the course
of rejecting the Site-Specific Approach: "The EPA documents everything about the waste sites and
stores these documents at a nearby regional office." North American, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.)
at G-10 (Oct. 25, 1988).
72. See, e.g., Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516,
528 A.2d 76 (1987); Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.
2d 334 (1987); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 46749 (Ga. June 22, 1989), reprinted in
3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (June 27, 1989); Specialty Coatings, 535 N.E.2d at 1077; cf. Asbestos
Ins. Coverage Cases, 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at 4463-68 (June 9, 1987) (relying on drafting
history in adjudicating asbestos insurance coverage case).
73. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-352D (W.D. Wash. July 24,
1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (Sept. 12, 1989) (hereinafter "Boeing"); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 558 A.2d 1091 (Del. Super. 1989); New Energy Co. v.
CIGNA Ins. Co., No. 30C01-8805-CP-273 (Ind. Cir. Hancock County Sept. 28, 1988); Stonewall Ins.
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., No. 86 Civ. 9671 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1988). But see, e.g., Great Lakes
Chem. Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 23C01-8711-CP-263 (Ind. Cir. Fountain County
1989), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 19 (May 23, 1989).
74. For example, documents produced by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company in Boeing, 3
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protective orders, the insurance industry has sealed from the public
view many of its most damaging admissions,"1 the fact remains that
these types of documents, and the witnesses who prepared them,
76
are the focus of environmental insurance coverage litigation.
Even granting the premise that some site-specific factual examination concerning each site is necessary in the coverage suit, the
Site-Specific Approach is both an unnecessary and inadequate solution. It is unnecessary because many of the issues can be resolved
largely through documentary evidence," which can be photocopied
and transported to the forum. 78 It is inadequate because the inquiry

Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (Sept. 12, 1989), belie the contention regularly made by it and by
other insurers that CERCLA responses costs are not "damages." See, e.g., Interoffice Communication
from Commercial Department to Casualty Field Offices entitled "Hazardous Waste-General Liability
Preliminary Underwriting Guidelines" at 4 (June 17, 1981) ("Damages may include ... all costs of
removal or remedial action."); Interoffice Communication from M. D. Coyle, Account Analyst, to
R. L. Stenlake, Director of National Accounts Department at 2 (June 15, 1981) (in non-environmental
context, advising "[d]o not define 'damages .. .' [as it] is understood to mean money."); David R.
Edwards, Counsel to Aetna, to Robert F. Braver, Vice President of Johnson & Higgins, at 3 (Dec.
18, 1972) ("As you recall, the definition of 'damages' in the 1966 policy was merely explanatory and
was not designed to be a limiting definition."). For a fuller treatment of this interesting record, see
Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism, and the Meaning of the CGL Policies, 1 ENVT CLiMs J.
279 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., No. JFM-88-99 (D. Md. Apr. 28,
1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-1 (May 9, 1989).
76. Perhaps the most illuminating statement on this issue comes, ironically, from a leading
insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company:
Because of the way the insurance industry operates, most of the relevant policy language
is found in standardized insuring forms, drafted by insurance associations or bureaus, and
used industry-wide. Thus, questions of intent may be addressed on a standardized basis.
Predictably, there will be precious little evidence of the negotiation of individual policies.
The primary evidence on the intent of the parties drafting the contracts, and their expectations about scope of coverage, will be obtained through document productions from key
industry-wide organizations, and depositions of their personnel.
Travelers' Reply Memorandum In Support of Coordination at 7-8 (filed Jan. 2, 1981), Armstrong
Cork Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C 31567, consolidated into Asbestos Ins. Coverage
Cases, 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 4,440 (June 9, 1987).
77. See, e.g., Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-10 (Oct. 25, 1988); see also OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 82-89, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1982) (making
observation with respect to an asbestos insurance coverage action) (hereinafter "Owens-Illinois");
Maremont Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 83-1814, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Apr. 25,
1984) (hereinafter "Maremont"); Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-8 (Oct. 25, 1988)
(relying on Owens-Illinois and Maremont) ("Because these actions concern[] insurance policies, there
is no need for a view of the premises").
78. See Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Purex Corp., No. 83-4077 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (declining
to exercise jurisdiction, in part, because parties had already agreed to set up a depository in Los
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into the underlying environmental liabilities may not be able to be
confined to a particular site. 79 Insurers typically contend that a policyholder's alleged knowledge about, for example, the hazardous
properties of chemicals at one site is chargeable against it as to all
sites. Further, often there is no connection between the location of
the particular site and the location of relevant documents and potential witnesses. Often, key personnel have relocated, many documents have been sent to storage facilities, and the EPA regional
80
office is situated in a state other than where the site is located.
The dispositive consideration is that there is no single jurisdiction
or group of jurisdictions that is decisively and generally convenient. 8 '
The Westinghouse appellate court, in explaining its decision to reverse the trial court, observed that "[w]hether the entire action is
tried comprehensively here or elsewhere or whether only a portion
of this action is tried here, witnesses will have to travel and documentary proofs will have to be transported." 2 Quoting approvingly
from another decision, the court went on to express its satisfaction
that neither forum was significantly more inconvenient than the other
in "an age when air travel, express mail, electronic data transmission, and videotaped depositions are part of the normal course of
business for companies such as these." 83 It is true that these in-

Angeles where a more comprehensive environmental insurance coverage action was proceeding); see
also North American, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at G-10 (Oct. 25, 1988) ("Documents from the
EPA regional offices can be mailed to this Court for review. Since any information obtainable from
the sites can be delivered to the Court in Delaware, this factor does not weigh overwhelmingly in
favor of defendants.").
79. "A waste-site can only offer a view of a 'hole or a pile.' The waste does not offer witnesses
or documents." North American, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at G-10 (Oct. 25, 1988) (quoting
transcript).
80. Id.
81. By siting the suit, the plaintiff, of course, has indicated the chosen forum is convenient
for itself. See Maremont, No. 83-1814, slip op. at 3; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hercules, Inc., No.
84-716, (D.Del. May 9, 1985), reprintedin 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 529, 531 (citing, inter alia,
American Ins. Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 433 F. Supp. 333, 338 (E.D. Wis. 1977)).
82. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 570, 559 A.2d at 438.
83. Id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Monsanto Co., 692 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D. Conn. 1988));
see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 87-6624 (Mass. Super. Suffolk County Jan.
20, 1989), reprinted in 3 Meaiey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-l, H-4 (Feb. 14, 1989) ("many potential
witnesses will not be subject to compulsory appearance in any state in which this action is brought").
Other courts have relied on the same factor in declining to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens. See National Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., No. 86-1406, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y.
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surance disputes generally transcend the boundary of the forum

state.84 But it is precisely because the commercial transactions are
national in scope that, as one court noted thirty years ago, the standard for forum non conveniens dismissals should be "exacting." 85
The private interest factors do not support the forced fragmentation
required by the Site-Specific Approach.

B. Public Interest Factors
The Site-Specific Approach also relies on two sets of public interest considerations: (i) choice-of-law concerns and (ii) the burden
purportedly imposed by comprehensive litigation on the forum, its
Jan. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (quoting Overseas Programming Co. v. Cinematographische Commerz-anstalt, 684 F.2d 232, 232 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982)) ("It is likely that witnesses and
documents will have to be transported wherever this action goes forward; in any case, transportation
problems are of diminishing importance in this age of 'modern telecommunications and jet travel."');
see also SEC v. Hart, 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 96,454, 93,645 (D.D.C. 1978) ("The record
indicates that the witnesses in this action are located throughout a substantial portion of the United
States and not exclusively in Connecticut. Travel by witnesses will be required regardless of the forum.");
Ideal Basic Indus. v. American Home Assurance Co., 590 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 (D. Colo. 1984)
(declining to dismiss on basis of forum non conveniens even though plaintiff had brought suit for
underlying loss in Canada and "much of the physical evidence and many of the witnesses" were not
located in forum); see generally Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1123 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (retaining jurisdiction and noting "[in truth, actions of this variety are hugely inconvenient
for everyone associated with them" no matter where they are tried").
84. See Maremont, No. 83-1814, slip op. at 4; see also Owens-Illinois, No. 82-89, slip op. at
3 (asbestos insurance coverage action "is actually a dispute that spills over state boundaries in terms
of interest and, as such, it can just as appropriately proceed in the District of Columbia as Ohio"
where the moving parties wished to transfer); cf. National Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance
Co., No. 86-1406, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (denying
forum non conveniens motion where dispute is "truly international: the making of the Bond, the
fraud, and the decisions concerning the claim all crossed the international boundary.").
85. Starr, 25 N.J. at 587, 138 A.2d at 51. Furthermore, the inconvenience, if any, to insurance
companies from litigating in a particular forum must be considered in light of their size and their
decision to engage in nationwide business activities. See North American, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.)
at G-8 (Oct. 25, 1988) ("[m]oreover, as a practical matter, the size and financial resources available
to the defendants substantially attenuates the concern that the cost of marshalling evidence to litigate
the suit in Delaware would place on them an undue burden"); Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
(Ins.) at F-8 (Oct. 25, 1988) (same in pertinent part); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
No. 3152-82, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1982) (denying motion to transfer in the asbestos insurance
coverage context and stating that "[i]t
is undisputed that each Defendant [insurer] named herein does
a substantial amount of business in this jurisdiction. Thus litigation herein may not be said to be
burdensome to them."); Owens-Illinois, No. 82-89, slip op. at 3 ("Both parties are huge corporations
that will not be materially inconvenienced regardless of when the suit proceeds, and whose witnesses
will be not be greatly disadvantaged if suit takes place in this forum."); Samson Cordage Works v.
Wellington Puritan Mills, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 155, 162 (D.R.I. 1969).
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taxpayers, its jurors, and-above all-the forum court itself. As we
show below, neither factor supports the Site-Specific Approach.
1. Choice of Law
Fragmentation of a comprehensive environmental insurance coverage lawsuit has three consequences, all negative, relating to choiceof-law concerns. First, multiple forums are obligated to tangle with
the complex choice-of-law exercise that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is designed to minimize.8 6 Second, the choice of law rules
of the relevant forums make likely the application of different states'
law to the same insurance contracts and require many courts (not
just one) to apply the law of a sister state.8 7 Third, the risk of
inconsistent interpretations of the same insurance contract (perhaps
under the same substantive law) between identical or nearly identical
parties is increased dramatically, as more courts are required to
choose the applicable law and to apply it. Such inconsistencies, for
example, on the issue of "trigger" could divest a policyholder of
insurance coverage, to which it is indisputably entitled if the law of
a single state, any state, is applied uniformly.8 This result defies
common sense and the applicable authority in West Virginia and
elsewhere. The efficient and rational approach is for a single court
to address the choice-of-law issue, weigh the relevant considerations,
and select the appropriate law. While it is true that some environmental insurance coverage actions (involving one or at most a handful of sites) have applied the law of the state where the liability
arose,8 9 no comprehensive environmental or toxic tort insurance cov-

86. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981).
87. Under the law of many states, including West Virginia, an insurance contract must be
interpreted in accord with the insured's reasonable expectations. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon
& Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495 (V.Va. 1987); Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Continental Casualty Co., 399 Mass. 598, 600, 506 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1987); see generally Keeton, Insurance
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARrv. L. Rav. 961, 966-74 (1970).
As Westinghouse noted, policyholders did not expect their rights to coverage to vary depending
on where the claim arose. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 476, 559 A.2d at 442.
88. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Witco Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 86-2997 (D.N.J. May 1, 1987); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos. C-87-2306 & C-87-2311 (Utah Dist. Salt Lake County
July 20, 1988), reprinted in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) B-1 (July 27, 1988).
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erage action has done so.90 In Westinghouse, an eighty-site environmental insurance coverage action, the New Jersey Appellate
Division explained that the choice-of-law problems raised in support
of the Site-Specific Approach could not justify fracturing the litigation:
In our view, the notion that the insured's rights under a single policy vary from
state to state depending on the state in which the claim invoking the coverage
arose contradicts not only the reasonable expectation of the parties but also the
common understanding of the commercial community. It also seems to us anomalous, in conflict-of-law terms, to suggest that more than one body of law will
apply to a single contract. The theme running through the federal mega-coverage
cases is the assumption not only that state law will determine whose insurance
law will govern the coverage dispute but also that it will be a single state's law,
chosen in accordance with the applicable conflict principles of the forum. 9 '

90. Even where adopted, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 193 (1971) does not
suggest a contrary result. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Argonaut-Midwest Ins. Co., Nos.
89-3025 and 89-3063, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir. July 26, 1989) ("By its terms, however, § 193 is limited
to cases in which there is an understanding among the parties as to the location of the insured risk
.
Comment b to [§ 193] further explains that the location of the insured risk has less significance
'where the policy covers a group of risks that are scattered throughout two or more states .... .' ");
see also Armotek, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at E-7-E-8 (Apr. 11, 1989). Even conceding arguendo
a state's interest in the cleanup of its environment, to sacrifice a policyholder's ability to effect a
consistent and economic determination of its insurance contract may raise serious questions regarding
the extent to which a state may pursue its public purposes at the expense of a citizen's, even a corporate
citizen's, rights. See generally Brilmayer, Rights, Fairnessand Choice of Law, 98 YAE L.J. 1277
(1989).
91. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 476, 559 A.2d at 442. See also Carey-Canada, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos. 84-3113 and 85-1640, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. March 31, 1988), reprinted
in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) C-1 (Apr. 13, 1988) (quoting Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, 1 Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 4440 (June 9, 1987)) ("[a]s in all complicated coverage disputes, it is critical that
we arrive at a decision 'which will be universally applicable to the insurance policies at issue.' "
Applying a multitude of states' laws would be " 'confusing, burdensome, unfair to plaintiffs if it
creates gaps in coverage,' and would be generally unwieldy"); see also Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying Michigan law to insurance coverage
action involving twenty-two different environmental sites in several different states); Armotek, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at E-9 (Apr. 11, 1989) (concluding that it was unlikely that the law of site
would apply to environmental insurance coverage action and declining to dismiss suit on the basis
of forum non conveniens); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. L-00745688 at 15-16 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Aug. 8, 1989).
The Westinghouse court recognized that the theme running through the federal mega-coverage cases is that a single state's law will govern coverage disputes chosen in accordance
with the applicable conflict-of law principles in the forum. The result in Westinghouse is
a logical one fashioned to avoid an otherwise chaotic situation and a multiplicity of litigation.
Moreover, "[o]ne of the factors which courts must consider in construing language of a policy is
whether the use by the insurer of alternative or more precise language would have 'put the matter
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Moreover, often many of the excess insurers have bound themselves contractually to the law of the forum chosen by plaintiffs.92
In several environmental insurance coverage cases, courts have relied

on, or alluded to, that premise in denying forum non conveniens
motions. 93 Assuming that a true conflict of law issue exists94 and

beyond reasonable question.' " Aetna Ins. Co. v. Weiss, 174 N.J. Super. 292, 296, 416 A.2d 426,
428 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 85 N.J. 127, 425 A.2d 284 (1980) (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident &
Casualty Ins. Co., 35 N.J. 1, 7, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (1961)). Thus, it is arguable that the failure of
the insurer-draftsmen to insert a choice-of-law provision in the standard policy form language constitutes a latent ambiguity, which must be construed in favor of the insured and in light of the
comprehensive insurance purposes of the policies themselves.
92. The standard consent-to-suit clause reads:
It is agreed that in the event of the failure of Underwriters hereon to pay any amount
claimed to be due hereunder, Underwriters hereon, at the request of the insured (or reinsured), will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the
United States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction
and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice
of such Court.
Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-5-F-6 n.6 (Oct. 25, 1988) (quoting provision); see also
Perini Corp. v. Orion Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 453, 454 (E.D. Cal. 1971); Euzzino v. London &
Edinburgh Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1964); General Phoenix Corp. v. Maylon, 88
F. Supp. 502, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
In any event, the promise to consent to jurisdiction severely undermines the ability of the insurers
to argue that the forum is inconvenient. See Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated Internat'l Ins.
Co., 576 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (M.D. La. 1984), quoted in Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unionamerica Ins.
Co., No. 85-9181, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
93. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 87-6624, (Mass. Super. Suffolk County Jan.
20, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-I, H-5 (Feb. 14, 1989) (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (1988) ("[a]t the very least, the existence of
a contractual forum selection clause is a 'significant factor that figures centrally' in the analysis of
forum issues")); see also Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-6 (Oct. 25, 1988); North
American, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at G-6 (Oct. 25, 1988). Consistent with that premise, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently interpreted the consentto-suit clause to constitute a "waiver of personal jurisdiction as well as a waiver of any venue objections." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
nom. Falcon Ins. Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); see also Rokeby-Johnson v. Kentucky
Agric. Energy Corp., 108 A.D.2d 336, 339, 489 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72-73 (1985) ("we hold that the traditional criteria utilized in the forum non conveniens analysis must defer to a freely negotiated, rational
forum selection clause the enforcement of which will not work undue hardship on any party");
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 427, 208 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1984), see generally
Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 37 SYR. L. REv. 361, 375-76 (1986) (discussing Rokeby-Johnson). But see
Turner & Newall, PLC v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 652 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1987); Schmid
Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 654 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1986).
94. Where there is no conflict in the competing states' interpretation of an insurance contract,
no choice of law decision need be made. See Quintana v. Brambila, 192 N.J. Super. 361, 364-65,
470 A.2d 22, 24 (1983); Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United Truck Leasing Corp., 24 Mass.
App. 626, 630-31 n.8, 511 N.E.2d 637, 640 n.8 (1987). Some courts have stated that basic principles
of insurance contract interpretation determine whether conflict exists. See Asbestos Ins. Coverage
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further assuming that the law of forum would not govern, there is
simply no reason why a state court cannot apply the substantive law

of another state. 95
2.

Burden on the Forum Court

Without doubt, the aspect of the Site-Specific Approach that

resonates most strongly with certain trial judges is its claim that
fracturing the suit will relieve a single court of the staggering burden
of adjudicating a "mega" coverage case. Notwithstanding its allure,
the argument violates basic jurisprudential precepts, including the
benefit of resolving disputes comprehensively and consistently. Its

consequence is to impose a far greater cumulative burden on the
judicial system, while at the same time diminishing the task of the
trial court relatively little.
The premise that a comprehensive environmental insurance coverage case is too large for a single court to adjudicate stands accepted
juridical practice on its head. 96 If any single consistent pattern can
Cases, Coordinated Proceeding No. 1072, slip op. at 9-10 Calif. Super. San Francisco County May
29, 1987). West Virginia falls within the mainstream of American jurisdictions in this regard. Compare
Huggins v. Tri-County Bonding Co., 337 S.E.2d 12, 18 (W.Va. 1985) with 13 J.A. & J. APPLEmAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 7385, 7401, 7403 (1976).

95. See, e.g., Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-6 (Oct. 25, 1988) ("If it were
necessary to adjudicate some or all issues of coverage using the laws of other States, this possibility
alone would not weigh overwhelmingly in favor of the defendants."); Koenig v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 284 Pa. Super. 558, 575, 426 A.2d 635, 644 (1980) ("In itself, the requirement to interpret
the laws of another jurisdiction should not cause a court to hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over the
parties."); cf. Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 88-5723 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1989), reprinted
in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) A-1 (May 23, 1989) (applying Missouri law to environmental insurance
coverage dispute).
96. The federal system possesses (and some argue that the state system should as well) a procedure for consolidating cases. See Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts,
96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987). The federal tool of multi-district litigation-specifically designed to capitalize
on the advantages of comprehensive litigation-consolidates cases with at least one common issue of
fact for pretrial proceedings (including consideration and disposition of motions for summary judgment). Indeed a "mega" environmental insurance coverage case has been consolidated in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. See In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., No. 764 (Jud Pan. Mult. Lit. May
31, 1988), reprinted in 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) F-I (June 8, 1988) (consolidation "will best serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation").
Moreover, there is some question as to the legitimacy of even considering the supposed burden
on the forum's judicial system. See Starr, 25 N.J. at 588, 138 A.2d at 52 ("We incline to the view
that if as between the litigants justice dictates that plaintiff's choice of forum be upheld, such should
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be discerned from the patchwork of insurance law, it is that coverage
disputes should be resolved in comprehensive, rather than piecemeal,
fashion.
Examples abound in both the toxic tort and environmental insurance coverage contexts. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. ForemostMcKesson, Inc.,97 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit stayed a piecemeal coverage lawsuit involving a sliver of the
policyholder's insurance program and only one segment of its toxic
tort liabilities-claims arising out of alleged ingestion of diethylstilbestrol ("DES'").98 The circuit court deferred to a more comprehensive state court action brought against all of the manufacturer's
liability insurers and encompassing its liabilities arising out of both
DES and other pharmaceuticals. 99 The appellate panel emphasized
that the state court action was "the more comprehensive, first-filed
action brought against all of the manufacturer's liability insurers
and encompassing its liabilities arising out of both DES and other
pharmaceuticals."100 Therefore, the state court action "is the logical
forum for the determination of the respective rights and obligations
of the parties and serves to further the interests of judicial economy."' 01 The court also detected the "real possibility" that the courts
might interpret the same standard policy language differently, thereby

be the result notwithstanding its impact upon the economy of the judicial system."); Brown v. Clorox
Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 306, 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1976) ("Every lawsuit tried places a burden
upon the courts, but at least one of the functions of the courts is to try lawsuits."); see Westinghouse,
233 N.J. Super. at 468, 55 A.2d at 437 ("We must, as a judicial system, devote our efforts to
determining how best to adjudicate controversies on their merits, not how to avoid adjudication.").
But see Semanishin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 46 N.J. 531, 535, 218 A.2d 401, 403 (1966) ("[I]t
would be unfair to the citizens of New Jersey to burden our courts with this imported litigation
.... "); United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Suffolk
County Feb. 24, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) H-1 (Feb. 28, 1989):
Adjudication of the claims including all non-Massachusetts sites will place a substantial
burden on both the citizens of this county and the treasury of Massachusetts. The courts
of this Commonwealth, already straining under the pressures of a staggering case load should
more appropriately reserve their resources for controversies in which Massachusetts holds
a real and substantial interest.
97. 751 F.2d 475 (Ist. Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 476.
99. Id. at 477.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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leaving the manufacturer without sufficient liability coverage from
insurers after paying premiums for many years. 0 2
Comprehensive adjudication is a guiding principle in environmental insurance coverage cases as well. A California trial court
recently decided both to enjoin a policyholder from pursuing a sitespecific suit and to add the subject matter of such suit to "its ongoing stewardship" of a pending comprehensive action. 03 It did so
by invoking, and referring to, the values underlying comprehensive

adjudication-the "prevent[ion of] a multiplicity of judicial proceedings, the possibility of conflicting rulings and inconsistent results
and the gross economic costs that would otherwise result. . .. ,,104
For similar reasons, the court in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Monsanto
Co.10 5 stayed an insurer's forty-site coverage suit in deference to the
policyholder's more comprehensive, later-filed action encompassing
a much greater portion of the relevant insurance program. 06 The
most significant factor, according to the court, was its "responsibility to discourage duplicative and piecemeal litigation .... It is
essential that such large-scale complex litigation be managed com-

prehensively.' 1 7 The court added that it was "not unmindful that
to the extent that the dispute between Monsanto and its carriers,
102. Id. See also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Philip Carey Corp., 482 F.Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (deferring to more comprehensive toxic tort insurance coverage action involving substantially
more of the underlying claims and insurers in order to avoid piecemeal litigation and perhaps conflicting policy interpretation). A similar result was reached in Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1986), an asbestos insurance coverage action,
even though all of the policyholder's insurers were not joined in the more comprehensive state court
action until after the federal suit-with only the single insurer and insured's successor-in-interest as
parties-was filed. In addition to the "critical factor[s]" offered by Foremost-McKesson; the court
emphasized that "inconsistent judgments as to the respective obligations of Raymark's excess insurers
would make the allocation of indemnity and defense costs and the handling and administration of
over 30,000 asbestos-related claims against [the policyholder] ... absolutely impossible." Id. at 415.
Under the Site-Specific Approach, conflicting adjudication may be unavoidable on procedural as well
as substantive issues. Each court has its own procedural and evidentiary rules, for example, with
respect to the number of interrogatories that may be propounded, the scope of the work product
doctrine, or the permissible period of discovery. Even under identical rules, however, it is quite
conceivable that the same discovery disputes as to relevance or privilege will be resolved differently
by different judges.
103. Purex Indus. v. Procter, No. C-446-935 (Cal. Super. Los Angeles County Aug. 20, 1987).
104. Id.
105. 692 F. Supp. 90 (D.Conn. 1988).
106. Id. at 93-94.
107. Id. at 92-93.
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including Travelers, is fragmented, any effort to resolve the matter

through settlement is likely to be frustrated."

108

This preference for

comprehensiveness is hardly limited to insurance coverage litigation.

West Virginia, like many states, has a tradition of strong support
for comprehensive adjudication of all types of suits.1°9

Quite apart from considerations of comprehensiveness, there is

no basis under traditional forum non conveniens law for a dismissal
where the alternative imposes a far greater burden on the public.
Yet, that is precisely what happens when the Site-Specific Approach
is adopted. Courts in multiple jurisdictions are required to preside
over duplicative disputes. In each of these jurisdictions, the parties

must file complaints, answers, interrogatories (and responses), requests for production (and responses), motions, briefs, and appendices-collectively duplicative of what would be filed in the

comprehensive litigation and partially duplicative of each other. Instead of perhaps fifty sets of counsel for the various parties, there

may be hundreds.
The judges burdened with these fractured lawsuits must also engage in duplicative factfinding. Each jurisdiction under the Site-Spe-

cific Approach is required to devote judicial resources to becoming
familiar with the policyholder's insurance program, including most
of the brokers, the insurers' representatives, the insurance industry's
expert drafting committees, the drafting history of key policy terms,
and the claims handling procedures of environmental and insurance
departments.
Compounding this overlap of judicial activity are the problems
inherent in administering the production of the same documents and

108. Id. at 93; see also General Reinsurance Corp. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 853 F.2d 78, 81 (2d
Cir. 1988) ("As the New Jersey action embraces all these issues, the risk of piecemeal litigation is
real and should be avoided."); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Purex Corp., No. 83-4077 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
6, 1984) (staying site-specific in order to avoid "piecemeal litigation" and to avoid "forc[ing] the
parties to litigate in at least two distinct forums").
109. See Miller v. Robinson, 301 S.E.2d 610, 614 (W. Va. 1983) ("the general policy of the
[West Virginia] Rules [of Civil Procedure is] to avoid multiple suits between the same parties"); see
also, e.g., Korff v. G. & G. Corp., 21 N.J. 558, 567, 122 A.2d 889, 893-94 (1956) ("[O]ur courts
are firmly committed to the enlightened policy which points generally to the joinder of all matters
in controversy between all of the parties in a single proceeding for just and expeditious disposition
at one time and place.").
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coordinating the depositions and trial testimony of the same witnesses. This process is further complicated by the presence of hundreds of law firms, different discovery tracks, and conflicting state
and local rules on the permissible scope of discovery, evidence, civil
procedure, and privilege.
In return for imposing this enormous burden on the courts of
multiple jurisdictions, the forum court spares itself very little. The
task of piecing together all or almost all of the insurance program
remains before the forum court. The contract interpretative discovery-including depositions of the insurers' expert draftsmen and production of the minutes of committees, articles, and drafting history
of disputed policy language-is not lessened in any meaningful sense
as a result of the court's dismissal of the non-forum sites.110 As with
the private interest factors, the Site-Specific Approach cannot be
justified by application of the Gulf Oil public interest factors.

V.

Ti

CASE LAW Tius FAR

The national strategy of AIG and Kemper has generated a growing body of case law consisting primarily of unpublished trial court
decisions. Westinghouse, with eighty sites and more than 140 parties,
was the first, and remains the most important, case to confront the
Site-Specific Approach. Accepting the arguments of Kemper, the
trial court in Westinghouse, as discussed above, dismissed the action
on forum non conveniens grounds except to the extent that the policyholder sought coverage for its New Jersey environmental (and
toxic tort) liabilities. 11 Emphasizing what it perceived to be the inevitable need for site-specific factfinding, the trial court believed the
cases as filed placed an excessive burden on a single court retaining
jurisdiction.
Several months later, Westinghouse was granted leave to appeal
the trial court's interlocutory order. On May 15, 1989, New Jersey's
110. Indeed, if the Site-Specific Approach were adopted in all states, the burden on the forum's
judicial system could increase as coverage suits situated in other state court systems would be trans.
ferred, with respect to the forum's environmental sites, to the forum state.
111. The Westinghouse litigation actually consisted of two suits, one seeking coverage for toxic
tort liabilities, the other for environmental liabilities.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/4
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appellate division issued its much-awaited opinion. Correcting what
it considered a misguided use of forum non conveniens as a case
management tool, the appellate court directed the trial court to determine whether the cases should proceed comprehensively in New
11 2
Jersey or in Pennsylvania.
In the opinion of the appellate division, Westinghouse's "litigation as presently postured is inordinately complex and ... its

conduct will pose formidable procedural problems which will surely
challenge the outer limit of judicial case management as presently
practiced."" 3 Despite these difficulties, the court observed that "forum non conveniens is simply the wrong doctrine in these circumstances.""14 For, as the appellate division concluded:
[T]he one component of the overall circumstantial complex which is the most
critical concern here was insufficiently considered in the trial court's analysis, and
that is the factor of piecemeal litigation. This kind of fractionalization is a most
potent weapon in the arsenal of the litigant whose primary and subversive aim
is to impose both upon the judicial system and the adversary by endlessly delaying
the day upon which the entire controversy will finally come to an end and the
respective rights of the litigants resolved clearly, consistently, and finally. It is
only the single comprehensive action, designed to adjudicate the entire controversy
between litigants, which can protect both the court and the parties from that
calculated imposition? '5

The Site-Specific Approach, with certain exceptions, has not fared
well in courts other than the Westinghouse trial court. Among the
6
exceptions is Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,"
in which a Connecticut trial court adopted the arguments supporting
the Site-Specific Approach and dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds an environmental insurance coverage suit with sites in eight
states." 7 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed but
did so on the narrow grounds that the trial court had not abused
112. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 468-71, 559 A.2d at 437-39. The New Jersey
subsequently retained jurisdiction of both lawsuits. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty
Co., Nos. L-069351-87 and L-069352-87 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Union County Sept. 18,
113. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. at 468, 559 A.2d at 437.
114. Id. at 470, 559 A.2d at 438.
115. Id. at 470-71, 559 A.2d at 438-39.
116. No. 294989 (Conn. Super. Danbury Dist. Feb.6, 1989), aff'd, 212 Conn. 311,
15 (1989).
117. Id.
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its discretion. 18 The Connecticut Supreme Court emphasized that,
in contrast to the situation pertaining in Westinghouse, the poli-

cyholder in Union Carbide "concededly subscribed" to the fragmentary approach, had withdrawn its appeal, and had acquiesced
in the filing of eight lawsuits throughout the country." 9

Notwithstanding the results in Union Carbide and a few other
cases, most courts to date have rejected the Site-Specific Approach.

Shortly after the trial court's decision in Westinghouse, West Virginia and California considered and rejected the arguments of AIG
and Kemper. In Joy Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

20

a proponent of the Site-Specific Approach, Puritan Insurance Company, on the heels of its victory in Westinghouse, moved to dismiss
Joy Technologies Corporation's coverage action in Mercer County,
West Virginia. The suit involved four sites located in West Virginia,
Colorado, Maine, and Ohio. On August 29, 1988, the trial court
2
denied the motion.' '

The California case, FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. ,122 is
an environmental insurance coverage action pending against 174 insurance carriers and involving forty-six hazardous waste sites in
twenty-two states (with only seven allegedly insignificant sites located
in the forum state). FMC Corporation is not a citizen of California
nor are the vast majority of defendants in that litigation. 2 The
California trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction over the entire
controversy was endorsed by the California Court of Appeals, which
observed: "it has not been demonstrated that granting petitioner's

118. Union Carbide, 212 Conn. at 320, 562 A.2d at 21.
119. Id. at 320, 562 A.2d at 20 ("This case ... does not present the same risk of excessive
fractionalizing of claims that concerned the New Jersey court in [Westinghouse]."); see also Id. at
320 n.6, 562 A.2d at 20 n.6. ("The plaintiff in [Westinghouse] was one of the parties pursuing the
appeal."). At least two other courts to date have adopted the Site-Specific Approach. See Avnet,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 11091/88 (N.Y.S. N.Y. County Feb. 1, 1989), reprinted in
3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) J-1 (Feb. 14, 1989) and United Technologies, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
(Ins.) H-1 (Feb. 28, 1989).
120. No. 88-C-96 (f. Va. Cir. Mercer County Aug. 29, 1988), reported in 2 Mealey's Litig.
Rep. (Ins.) 10 (Oct. 25, 1988).
121. Id.
122. No. 643058 (Calif. Super. Santa Clara County Mar. 11, 1988) (hereinafter "FMC").
123. Id.
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motion for dismissal forum non conveniens would foster judicial
24

economy."'1

In addition to the Joy and FMC decisions, at least eight other
trial courts-one in California, 125 one in Illinois,' 26 two in New Jersey,' 27 one in Ohio,' 8 one in Rhode Island'2 9 and two in Delaware' 30-

have declined to follow the Site-Specific Approach. The companion
Delaware cases, Monsanto and North American, are particularly
noteworthy because of their extensive exposition and analysis of fo-

rum non conveniens in the environmental insurance coverage context.' 31 Among the notable aspects of the opinions was the vigor

with which the court embraced comprehensive adjudication. In support, the three practical "considerations" offered by the court were

(i) the existence of substantial precedent in other courts having adjudicated coverage actions concerning multiple environmental sites;
(ii) the elimination of the possibility of inconsistent adjudications;

and (iii) the benefits to judicial economy inhering in the comprehensive approach.' 32 In summary, judges, whether favoring or opposing the Site-Specific Approach, have acknowledged the substantial

challenges posed by multi-site environmental insurance coverage cases.
Most, however, have rejected the Site-Specific Approach.

124. Id.
125. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., No. 850504 (Cal. Super. San Francisco
County Aug. 4, 1988), mandamus denied sub nom. Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, No. A043322
(Cal. App. Dec. 2, 1988).
126. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 87-L-39 (Ill. Cir.
Morgan County Oct. 30, 1989), reported in 4 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 15 (Nov. 28, 1989).
127. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Abeille-Paix Reassurances, No. MRSL-226-88, (N.J. Super. Law Div.
Morris County Aug. 25, 1988); Peabody Int'l Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. C-242-87,
(N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Mercer County Aug. 10, 1988).
128. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., No. CV-89-01-0158 (Ohio Comm. Pl. Summit
County Aug. 10, 1989), reported in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 22-23 (Aug. 22, 1989).
129. Avco Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 87-3496, (R.I. Super. Feb. 24, 1988).
130. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89-AU-99 (Del. Super. New
Castle County Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 4 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) C-1 (Nov. 28, 1989). The
Monsanto and North American Philips opinions are virtually identical and are authored by the same
Delaware trial judge.
131. Even though none of the underlying sites in Monsanto and North American Philipsis located
in Delaware and neither of the policyholder plaintiffs is headquartered in Delaware, the Delaware
Superior Court refused to dismiss any portion of either case.
132. Monsanto, 2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at F-14-F-15 (Oct. 25, 1988); North American,
2 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) at G-12 (Oct. 25, 1988).
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VI.
CONCLUSION: STATE COURTS ARE EQUIPPED TO MANAGE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES

Experience has taught that comprehensive environmental insurance coverage actions can be managed. Under the law of most states,

arrangement may be made for out-of-state depositions that can be
read at trial if necessary.' 3 3 Videotaped depositions are by now almost commonplace in West Virginia and other states. 3 4 In many
jurisdictions, a master can be appointed to preside over the discovery
necessary at a particular site.' 3 5 Both policyholders and insurers alike

have found that a well-conceived case management order or series
of such orders negotiated by the parties themselves can provide the
stability and flexibility for an orderly piece of litigation.,36
There is, of course, no single method for adjudicating a comprehensive suit. The appellate division in Westinghouse suggested a
133. See e.g., MAss. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 32; see also American Home
Assurance Co. v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 603 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motion
to transfer and observing that arrangements had been made to depose all foreign witnesses).
134. Bennett v. Keadle, 334 S.E.2d 643, 645 (V. Va. 1985) ("[d]ue to recent technological
advances and diminished equipment costs, videotaped depositions have become a familiar component
of pretrial practice in this State"); Roche v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 400 Mass. 217, 508
N.E.2d 614 (1987); Mills v. Dortch, 142 N.J. Super. 410, 415-17, 361 A.2d 606, 609 (App. Div.
1976).
135. See Peabody Int'l Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. C-242-87 at 62-63 (N.J. Super.
Ch. Div. Mercer County Aug. 10, 1988) (noting possibility as one reason supporting rejection of SiteSpecific Approach). Numerous environmental insurance coverage cases have used a special master.
See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-325D (W.D. Wash. July 24, 1989),
reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) E-I (Sept. 12, 1989); J. T. Baker Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., No. 86-4994 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 1989), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) C-I (Feb.
28, 1989). The benefits of such masters can be especially significant in complex cases. See Hazard
& Rice, Judicial Management of the PretrialProcess in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case
Managers, 1982 Ai. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 375 (1982). Such a procedure is permitted under West Virginia
law. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6); see also Gardner, 372 S.E.2d at 795 (Neely, J., dissenting)
("Such mechanisms as privately paid special masters, privately paid advisory juries to assist in determining damages for court supervised settlements, and other litigant-financed contributions to the
courts' logistical support all seem to me entirely appropriate.").
136. In such orders, the parties may agree to a series of procedures that streamline the litigation
including: (i) creation of steering committees; (ii) the phasing of discovery by issue or by location of
site; (iii) requirement of coordinated, master sets of written discovery; (iv) selection of document
depositories; (v) pre-designation of exhibits to be used in depositions; (vi) a jointly-created notebook
summarizing all key policy information to which the parties may then refer. For examples of case
management orders, see Case Management Order No. 1, Northrop Corp. v. Evanston Ins. Co., No.
C566129 (Cal. Super. Los Angeles County), reprinted in 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) F-I (Apr. 11,
1989) and Case Management Order No. 2, Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 88CJA-118 (Del. Super. New Castle County Mar. 6, 1989), reprintedin 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 01 (Apr. 11, 1989).
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three-step process, beginning with resolving choice-of-law problems,
then moving to the legal interpretations of the policy language, and
lastly deciding the residual factual disputes. 3 7 As to the last step,
which would encompass the site-specific issues, the appellate division
offered several illustrative methods for achieving an efficient resolution: (i) summary judgment after record is created; (ii) a trial as
to certain prototypical claims; and (iii) fact-finding in other jurisdictions in light of the trial court's previously issued, and binding,
interpretative principles. 3 8 Other courts have selected prototype sites
as to which the parties conduct extensive discovery with the goal of
reaching a coverage determination that may be applied to other
sites. 3 9 Regardless of the method chosen, we nevertheless believe,
as did the Westinghouse appellate court, that "trial courts have
40
available to them both the basic techniques and the judicial skill"'
without recourse to forum non conveniens to manage comprehensive
environmental insurance coverage actions consistent with the interests of the litigants and of the judicial system as a whole.

137. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. at 475-79, 559 A.2d at 441-43.
138. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. 479, 559 A.2d at 443.
139. Allied Signal Inc. v. Abeille-Paix Reassurances, No. MRSL-226-88 at 126-28 (N.J. Super.
Law Div. Aug. 25, 1988); Peabody Int'l Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. C-242-87 at 6263 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Mercer County Aug. 10, 1988)'
140. Westinghouse, 233 N.J. Super. 468, 559 A.2d at 437.
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